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ABSTRACT
A recent antitrust lawsuit against the National Residency Matching Program renewed interest
in understanding the e￿ects of a centralized match on wages of medical residents. Bulow and Levin
(forthcoming) propose a simple model of the NRMP, in which firms set impersonal salaries
simultaneously, before matching with workers, and show that a match leads to lower aggregate
wages compared to any competitive outcome.
This paper models a feature present in the NRMP, ordered contracts, that allows firms to set
several contracts while determining the order in which they try to fill these contracts. I show that the
low wage equilibrium of Bulow and Levin is not robust to this feature of the NRMP, and competitive
wages are once more an equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, a match with ordered contracts has
di￿erent properties than former models of centralized matches with multiple contracts.
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In response to a recent antitrust lawsuit against the National Residency Matching Program,
Bulow and Levin (forthcoming) show that when ﬁrms set impersonal salaries simultaneously,
before matching with workers, then such a match leads to lower aggregate wages compared to
any competitive outcome. Crawford (forthcoming) shows that this concern can be addressed by
incorporating ﬂexible salaries in the centralized match, that is, the possibility for each position
to have more than one potential salary, with the ﬁnal salary to be determined together with the
worker-ﬁrm pairing. This builds on earlier work that shows that a match in which each position
can have a large number of contracts, which I will call a multiple contract match, allows for
competitive outcomes (Crawford and Knoer 1981; Kelso and Crawford, 1982, Roth 1984b, and
see also, Hatﬁeld and Milgrom 2005).
Here, I observe that the NRMP has a feature that I will call ordered contracts, that destroys
the low wage equilibrium of Bulow and Levin and in fact allows for competitive outcomes. In
a match with ordered contracts, ﬁrms can specify several possible contracts, just as in a match
with ﬂexible contracts. However, ﬁrms can also determine the order in which they prefer to ﬁll
these contracts. Speciﬁcally, at any point in the match, only one type of contract is available
which is in contrast to a match with multiple contracts. This new and additional control ﬁrms
have over contracts results in new properties concerning which stable outcomes are reached
through diﬀerent adequately modiﬁed deferred acceptance algorithms. Most importantly, the
set of contracts reached through either a ﬁrm or worker proposing suitably modiﬁed deferred
acceptance algorithm is the same, which is in general not the case in a multiple contract match.
These results will cast the lesson we learned from Bulow and Levin in a new light.
Since 1951 the market for medical residents has been organized through a centralized match-
ing procedure which assigns medical students to residency programs using a variant of a deferred
acceptance algorithm. The match was introduced to ensure a uniform appointment date, con-
trol the unraveling of hiring decisions, and reduce congestion problems of other, decentralized
plans that tried to promote late and uniform hiring (see Roth 2003). In 1998 Roth and Peran-
son introduce a new algorithm, that switched from a hospital proposing to a student proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm. The new algorithm also incorporates several special features,
such as accommodating couples who want two jobs. A second special feature is to allow for
ordered contracts, or reverting positions. Programs that try to ﬁll a position under a certain
contract can, in case they do not ﬁnd a suitable candidate, change (or revert) that contract to
a position with a diﬀerent contract (see Roth and Peranson 1999). This allows programs to
eﬀectively have more than one contract for any position, while being able to control the order
in which they want to try to ﬁll those positions.
In the 1990’s about 7 percent of the three to four thousand programs that participate in
each year have contracts that could revert to other contracts if they remain unﬁlled (accounting
2for almost 6 percent of the total quota of positions). Roth and Peranson (1999) note that such
reversions typically occur when, for example, a director of a second-year postgraduate program
arranges with the director of a ﬁrst-year prerequisite program that his residents will spend their
ﬁrst year in that prerequisite program. If the second-year program fails to ﬁll all its positions,
then the vacancies can “revert” to the ﬁrst-year program to be ﬁlled by other applicants. More
recently, in the reinstitution of the fellowship match for gastroenterologists, this feature is
especially advertised to, for example, allow programs to try to ﬁll a slot ﬁrst with a research
fellow, and in case no suitable research fellow can be attracted, the program can decide to
ﬁll this position with a more clinically oriented fellow instead (see Niederle, Proctor and Roth
2006).
In 2002 an antitrust law suit was ﬁled, charging that the main eﬀect of the match is to
suppress wages of medical residents. Bulow and Levin develop a stylized model to analyze the
eﬀects of using a centralized match such as the NRMP on wages. In their model, the surplus for
ﬁrm n (1 ≤ n ≤ N) from hiring worker m is ∆n · m, where ∆N ≥ ∆N−1.. ≥ ∆1. Workers care
only about their salary, p. In their simple model of the NRMP ﬁrms simultaneously announce
a wage at which they are willing to hire any worker. Workers form preferences over ﬁrms after
the announcement, where each worker prefers ﬁr m sw i t hh i g h e rw a g e s . T h e na na s s o r t a t i v e
matching occurs, that matches more productive workers with ﬁrms that oﬀer a higher wage. The
main result of the paper is that this model yields wage compression, sub-competitive average
wages and higher proﬁts for ﬁrms compared to any competitive outcome. The intuition for the
result is that, compared to a competitive market, ﬁrms cannot change their salaries depending
on the worker they end up hiring.1
As such, the paper can be seen as providing support for the contention that a centralized
match, such as the NRMP, may indeed be used to reduce wages. However, in fact the NRMP
allows for ordered contracts, and in this paper I show that a match with ordered contracts
allows for more wage competition that can restore competitive outcomes.
For a stylized model of the NRMP with ordered contracts, I introduce a small change in
the Bulow and Levin framework, which will have a big eﬀect on wages. Each ﬁrm i, instead
of advertising only one position at one contract (wage) can create a second contract for the
same position, and decide which subset of workers is eligible. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm i,i n s t e a do f
announcing only one wage pi can announce two (or more) wages pi and pS
i , and determine which
workers are eligible for each contract. Firm i ﬁrst tries to ﬁll the position at contract pS
i . If it
1The problem that ﬁrms cannot change their salary when they try to hire diﬀerent workers becomes important
when ﬁrms are asymmetric, that is when, for example, some ﬁrms are clearly more productive than others. In
this case a competitive outcome calls for gaps in the wages paid to diﬀerent workers which are not reproduced
by equilibrium strategies when ﬁrms simultaneously set one wage for their position indendent of the worker
they end up hiring. Furthermore, while the fact that ﬁrms cannot announce which (subset of) worker is eligible
for their unique wage oﬀer has some eﬀect in reducing average wages, it cannot account for the whole problem.
3fails to ﬁll this position, then the contract is changed (or reverted) to a new contract pi, and
ﬁrm i tries to ﬁll the position at this new contract with a new set of eligible workers for that
contract.
While Roth and Peranson (1999) mention that they include ordered contracts in their
redesign of the NRMP, they did not present a formal model. Issues such as the appropriate
deﬁnition of stability, existence of stable matches, incentives of applicants and ﬁrms to submit
various contracts and rank order lists, and the diﬀerence from matches with multiple contracts
as introduced by Crawford and Knoer (1981) have not been analyzed.2 While a model with
ordered contracts shares the deﬁnition of stability with a multiple contract match, I propose a
modiﬁcation to the deferred acceptance algorithm to accommodate ordered contracts. These
modiﬁcations imply that the contracts reached are the same, whether a ﬁrm or applicant
proposing algorithm is used. The reason is that a ﬁrm can control the order in which positions
are made available as opposed to simply having a multitude of simultaneous potential contracts.
After analyzing a model of ordered contracts, I show the two main eﬀects on wages which are:
First, when other ﬁrms play the mixed strategies in the wage setting equilibrium of Bulow
and Levin, every ﬁrm has a strict incentive to use ordered contracts, and can strictly increase
its expected payoﬀ.
Second, if all ﬁrms use ordered contracts, there exists an equilibrium in which wages are
competitive.
The actual NRMP algorithm is therefore able to achieve competitive outcomes in the model
of Bulow and Levin with the use of ordered contracts.
A separate issue concerns what the wages of medical residents would be in a market without
a match. The history of the market for medical residents (Roth 1984a) itself casts doubt that
a market without a clearinghouse should be thought of as a competitive market. Niederle
and Roth (2003b, 2004a and 2005) and Niederle, Proctor and Roth (2006) show that the
labor market for gastroenterology fellows, after they stopped using a centralized match, once
more unraveled, with thin and dispersed markets, and reduced mobility. A survey of program
directors in this market reveals that even after the market operated without a match for nearly
a decade, most programs oﬀer the same wage to all their fellows (i.e. impersonal wages).
Furthermore, a comparison of wages of internal medicine subspecialty fellows in specialties that
do and do not use a match reveals that wages are not diﬀerent for specialties that use the match
(Niederle and Roth 2003a and 2004a.) It seems that Gastroenterology programs prefer to use
a dimension of contracts diﬀerent from the terms of employment, namely exploding oﬀers, or
t h ea m o u n to ft i m ea no ﬀer is available to close contracts, and to avoid losing fellows to their
2Roth and Peranson (1999) show how applicants who want two kinds of contracts, namely a ﬁrst-year contract
and a second-year contract, as well as couples who want two jobs, present complementarities that may make the
set of stable matchings empty. They fail to note that ordered contracts, or reversions of positions in themselves
are not a source of complementarities, and hence do not pose any problems for the existence of stable matchings.
4competitors (Niederle, Proctor and Roth 2006).3
The NRMP, a matching program that allows for ordered contracts, therefore allows for wage
competition. Furthermore, eliminating a centralized match, such as the NRMP, may result in
an overall reduction of competition, as wages seem not to be aﬀected, but hospitals use a
decentralized unraveled market to exercise local market power in time to limit the positions
candidates can contemplate (see also Niederle and Roth 2004b.) That is, it appears that the
NRMP does not in fact force wages to be impersonal. Therefore, when we observe impersonal
wages (e.g. all new hires in a given program receive the same wage), this is due to other factors.
The results of Bulow and Levin may still apply, i.e. that wages may be more compressed then
if each worker were paid his marginal product. However, the match is not the cause.
2A S i m p l e E x a m p l e
The following simple example illustrates the idea behind the low wage equilibrium of Bulow
and Levin, and how ordered contracts undermine this equilibrium, and can restore competitive
outcomes.
Consider a market with 3 ﬁrms, and 3 workers, where each ﬁrm wants to match with one
worker, and every worker can work for at most one ﬁrm. Firm n’s proﬁt from hiring worker m
at wage p is m·n−p, and worker m’s proﬁti sp, t h a ti sw o r k e r sc a r eo n l ya b o u tt h ew a g et h e y
receive, not for which ﬁrm they work. Wages in a competitive equilibrium have to be such that
t h em a t c h i n gi se ﬃcient, that is, worker i works for ﬁrm i.
Worker 1’s competitive wage is p1 ∈ [0,1], such that ﬁrm 1 and worker 1 both receive
non-negative surplus. The wage p2 of worker 2 has to be high enough, that ﬁrm 1 does not
prefer to employ worker 2 at p2 compared to employing worker 1 at p1, that is 1−p1 ≥ 2−p2.
Furthermore, p2 h a st ob el o we n o u g h ,t h a tﬁrm 2 prefers employing worker 2 at that wage to
employing worker 1 at the wage p1, that is 4−p2 ≥ 2−p1, hence p2 ∈ [p1+1,p 1+2]. Similarly,
p3 ∈ [p2 +2 ,p 2 +3 ] . The lowest competitive wages are therefore 0,1 and 3.
Now consider a centralized match where ﬁrms simultaneously announce wages, followed by
an assortative matching by worker productivity and wages. In the example, clearly none of the
three ﬁrms will post the lowest competitive wage, since, for example, ﬁrm 3 has an incentive to
lower the wage closer to p2. This of course in turn will make ﬁrm 2 want to compete for worker
3 and hence increase its wage. Bulow and Levin (forthcoming) show that in equilibrium ﬁrms
use mixed strategies for wages. Firm 1 oﬀers 0 with a probability 5/6, and any wage between
(0,1/3] with a density of 1/2. Firm 2 oﬀers any wage between (0,1/3] with a density of 1 and a
3Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser (2003) show that similarly in the market for college students, colleges use
the option of early decision, to secure students and limit their availability to competitors.
5wage between (1/3,7/3] with a density of 1/3. Firm 3, ﬁnally, makes oﬀers between [1/3,7/3]
with a density of 1/2.
These strategies clearly result in wage compression, and in lower average wages for workers
namely 0.02, 0.73 and 1.56, though worker 1 receives a higher wage than in the lowest wage
competitive equilibrium. Strategies also result in higher proﬁts for ﬁrms, namely 1, 3.67 and
6.67 compared to 1, 3 and 6 in the competitive equilibrium.
Now I introduce the change that ﬁrm i, instead of advertising only one position at one
wage can create a second contract for that same position, for which only a subset of workers
is eligible. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm i, instead of announcing only one wage pi announces two wages pi
and pS
i , and determines which of the workers are eligible for pS
i , t h ec o n t r a c ti tp r e f e r sw h e n
trying to ﬁll the position. Workers observe all four contracts, that is they observe pj for j 6= i,
pi and pS
i and rank all four contracts according to the announced wage (and in case of ties
prefer more productive ﬁrms.)
In the simple example, a matching algorithm that yields a stable outcome is as follows: The
centralized procedure uses pS
i ,p j for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 3 to create an assortative match just as before
(though pi is not used yet, as ﬁrm i has only one position and can hire at most one worker.).
This interim match is the ﬁnal match if ﬁrm i ﬁlls its position at pS
i . If ﬁrm i is unmatched,
then pS
i gets replaced by pi and the new assortative match is the ﬁnal allocation.
Suppose ﬁrm 1 is the ﬁrm that can make a normal wage oﬀer p1,a n daw a g eo ﬀer connected
to a “star-position” pS
1. Then the following strategy makes ﬁrm 1 strictly better oﬀ than simply
only announcing one wage p1 according to the Bulow and Levin equilibrium. Let pS
1 =1 /6,
the midpoint of the highest interval on which ﬁrm 1 is randomizing over wages, and competing
f o rw o r k e r1a n dw o r k e r2 ,a n dl e to n l yw o r k e r2( a n d3 )b ee l i g i b l ef o rt h i sc o n t r a c tpS
1.T h e n
the expected surplus of ﬁrm 1 is 1.08, strictly higher than 1. The intuition is that compared
to Bulow and Levin, where ﬁrm 1 is indiﬀerent between all strategies, and hence its payoﬀ is
for example determined by oﬀering wage p1 =1 /3, and hiring worker 2 and worker 1, ﬁrm 1
with the use of its star-position has a positive chance to hire worker 2 at a lower wage. The
expected wage of worker 2 is 0.86.
Similarly, if either only ﬁrm 2 or only ﬁrm 3 can have a star-position contract, they can
announce pS =4 /3, and only worker 3 is eligible for this job, and otherwise announce p2 or p3
respectively as in the Bulow-Levin equilibrium.
When all ﬁrms can have a star-position contract, then there exists an equilibrium in which
workers receive their competitive salaries, the lowest of which are 0,1 and 3 respectively. Each
ﬁrm i can discipline the wage oﬀer of ﬁrm i+1to worker i+1with the star-position contract.
Speciﬁcally, let ﬁrm 1 have pS
1 =1 , for which only workers 2 and 3 are eligible, and in case the
position does not get ﬁlled, it reverts to a contract p1 =0for which all workers are eligible. Let
ﬁrm 2 have pS
2 =3 , for which only worker 3 is eligible, and in case the position does not get
ﬁlled, p2 =1for which workers 2 and 3 are eligible. Firm 3 has no real use of a star contract, so,
6let ﬁrm 3 only use its normal position and let p3 =3for which only worker 3 is eligible. When
we assume that, in case of ties, workers prefer more productive ﬁrms, then the star-position
contracts ensure that ﬁrms cannot lower their salaries for the standard position, and that the
strategies form a Nash Equilibrium. Given the contracts of all other ﬁrms, it is easy to see
that no ﬁrm can gain by deviating, as each ﬁrm is disciplined in its wage oﬀer by the slightly
less productive ﬁrm, and no worker can gain from declining to rank some contracts. Note that
ﬁrm 1, in order to discipline the wage oﬀer of ﬁrm 2, needs to oﬀer the star-contract only with
probability 1/2.4 Similarly, ﬁrm 2 has to oﬀer the star-contract only with probability 2/3, to
eﬀectively discipline ﬁrm 3’s wage oﬀer.
Before I show that the results of the example generalize, I analyze matching with ordered
contracts. I show existence of stable matchings, how deferred acceptance algorithms have to
be modiﬁed to account for ordered contracts, and how a match with ordered contracts diﬀers
from a match with multiple contracts as introduced by Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso
and Crawford (1982).
3 Matching with Ordered Contracts
In a ﬁrst section I summarize known ﬁndings on simple markets in which each ﬁrm oﬀers only
one ﬁxed wage for their position (see also Roth and Sotomayor 1990). Then I formally deﬁne
markets with ordered contracts, show existence of stable matchings and how some standard
r e s u l t sf a i lt ob et r u ei nt h i sm o r eg e n e r a lf r a m e w o r k .
3.1 Stable Matching in a simple ﬁxed-wage framework
The market consists of a set F of ﬁrms and a set W of workers, where every ﬁrm has speciﬁed
one ﬁxed contract for the position it advertises. Every worker w has strict preferences Âw over
all ﬁrms and herself (if she prefers at some point to rather be unmatched), that is, Âw implies
a strict ordering on the set F ∪{w}. Similarly, every ﬁrm has strict preferences over W ∪{f}.
Each worker can work for (be matched to) at most one ﬁrm, and every ﬁrm can employ (be
matched to) at most one worker. Formally, a matching μ is a function μ : F ∪ W → F ∪ W
such that ∀w,f :( i) |μ(w)| = |μ(f)| =1 , (ii) μ(w) ∈ F ∪ {w} and μ(f) ∈ W ∪ {f} and
(iii) μ(w)=f ⇔ μ(f)=w. Am a t c h i n gi sstable,i fe v e r yﬁrm and worker is matched to an
4Firm 2 prefers to announce the contract p2 =1versus p2 =0 , if ﬁrm 1 oﬀers pS
1 =1with probability q
such that (2 · 2 − 1) ≥ (1 − q)(2 · 2 − 0) + q(2 · 1 − 0), that is q ≥ 1/2. Furthermore, ﬁrm 2 cannot use his
star-contract to exploit the fact that ﬁrm 1 oﬀers pS
1 =1with probability q, and whenever ﬁrm 1 does not oﬀer
a starcontract, try to recruit worker 2 with pS
2 =0(where only worker 2 is eligible) and in case the position is
not ﬁlled, that is, whenever ﬁrm 1 does oﬀer the starcontract, revert the contract to p2 =1 . The reason this
is not robust, is that worker 2 can simply announce that the low wage “star-contract” is unacceptable, and so
always ensure a high salary of 1.
7acceptable partner (that is, no ﬁrm or worker is rather unmatched than remaining with the
current match) and if there does not exist a ﬁrm-worker pair that are currently not matched
to each other, but prefer each other to their current match. Formally, a matching μ is stable if
(i) ∀w,f : If μ(w)=f then μ(w) Âw w and μ(f) Âf f, and (ii) @f,w such that f Âw μ(w)
and w Âf μ(f).
In this simple model, the set of stable matchings is always nonempty, and there exists a
stable match that all ﬁrms prefer over any other stable match (and which all workers like less
than any other stable matching). This ﬁrm optimal stable matching can be obtained by the
Firm Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm DA (Gale and Shapley 1962).
Step 1: Firms make oﬀers to their most preferred worker. Workers collect all their
oﬀers, keep their most preferred acceptable oﬀer, and reject any other oﬀers.
Step k: Firms whose oﬀer was rejected in Step k-1 make an oﬀer to their next
most desirable worker. Workers collect all their oﬀers, keep their most preferred
acceptable oﬀer, and reject any other oﬀers.
The algorithm ends when either no ﬁrm has its oﬀer rejected, or all rejected ﬁrms
have already been rejected by all the workers to which they are willing to make an
oﬀer.
The key to stability of this outcome is that no worker ever regrets having rejected a ﬁrm’s
oﬀer, since she does so only when she has an oﬀer she prefers, and she will be matched to that
preferred ﬁrm, unless she receives an oﬀer she prefers even more. This implies that no ﬁrm
whose oﬀer is rejected in the algorithm has any hope that the oﬀer would be accepted at any
later stage. Furthermore, the stable outcome reached is the ﬁrm optimal stable outcome, that
is the stable outcome that any ﬁrm weakly prefers over any other stable outcome.
Furthermore, it is a dominant strategy for ﬁrms to submit their true preferences, that is
they cannot gain by misrepresentation (Dubins and Freedman, 1981, and Roth 1982). This is
not true for workers, who can gain by truncating their preferences. In theory the amount of
optimal truncation can be substantial (see Coles 2005), though in practice they may not be
that large (Roth and Peranson 1999). Similarly, there exists a worker optimal stable matching
that is reached by a worker proposing deferred acceptance algorithm.
3.2 Stable Matching with Ordered Contracts
In a model with ordered contracts every ﬁrm i can have up to K contracts p1
i,...,p K
i , let Pi
be the set of contracts and Ki the number of contracts of ﬁrm i. For each contract pk
i, ﬁrm i
speciﬁes a strict preference ordering over the set of workers eligible for this contract Wk
i ⊆ W.
For example, ﬁrm i may decide that a speciﬁcw o r k e rw m a yb ee l i g i b l ef o rp1
i, but not for p2
i.
8Furthermore ﬁrm i has a strict ordering over which contract should be ﬁlled ﬁrst. Let the ﬁrst
contract be p1
i, and only if ﬁrm i cannot ﬁll the position at p1
i, will ﬁrm i try to recruit workers
at p2
i, and so on.
Firm f has preferences over {f} ∪ Pi × W, where, by deﬁnition, for any k,j such that
k + j<K i, ∀w ∈ Wk






Let PF be the total set of contracts, where pf ∈ PF ® f ∈ F and p is a contract that f
oﬀers. A worker w has preferences over {w} ∪ PF.
The deﬁnition of a matching is similar to before, only that we replace ﬁrms with contracts,
and additionally ensure that each ﬁrm has only one of its contracts ﬁlled. Formally, a matching
is a function μ : PF ∪ W → PF ∪ W such that ∀w,pf (i) |μ(w)| = |μ(pf)| =1 , (ii) μ(w) ∈
PF ∪ {w} and μ(pf) ∈ W ∪ {pf} and (iii) μ(w)=pf ⇔ μ(pf)=w and (iv) ∀f : |{pf :
μ(pf) ∈ W}| ≤ 1.
For any matching μ let, in slight abuse of notation, μ(f) be the position, worker pair in case
f has one of its contracts ﬁlled, and otherwise let μ(f) be f.
Am a t c h i n gi ss t a b l ei ft h e r ee x i s t sn oﬁrm, worker, contract triplet such that the ﬁrm
would rather ﬁll its position with that worker at that contract, and the worker would rather
accept that contract, than stay with their current match. Formally, a matching is stable if (i)
∀w,pf,f : If μ(w)=pf then μ(w) Âw w and μ(f) Âf f, and (ii) @f,pf,wsuch that pf Âw μ(w)
and (pf,w) Âf μ(f).
To show that a stable matching always exists, I provide a modiﬁed deferred acceptance
algorithm whose outcome is always a stable match.
I start with the simpler ﬁrm proposing modiﬁed deferred acceptance algorithm, before I
show the worker proposing modiﬁed deferred acceptance algorithm. Then I show that they
both yield stable outcomes.
The Firm Proposing Modiﬁed Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: MDA
MDA Step 1: All ﬁr m sh a v eo n l yt h e i rﬁrst contract available.
DA: Step 1: Firms make oﬀers to their most preferred worker. Workers collect
all their oﬀers, keep their most preferred acceptable oﬀer, and reject any other oﬀers.
Step k: Firms whose oﬀer was rejected in Step k-1 make an oﬀer to their
next most desirable worker. Workers collect all their oﬀers, keep their most preferred
acceptable oﬀer, and reject any other oﬀers.
The DA sub-algorithm ends when either no ﬁrm has its oﬀer rejected, or all
rejected ﬁr m sh a v en om o r ew o r k e r st h e yw a n tt om a k ea no ﬀer to, at the current
contract.
MDA Step k: Any ﬁrm that has its position at contract p
j
i unﬁlled, changes the
contract to p
j+1
i in case it has another contract to revert to. Then the algorithm
9continues with a DA sub-algorithm, where all previous oﬀers are cancelled and have
to be remade.
The algorithm ends, when all ﬁr m st h a th a v en oo ﬀer held by an applicant have no
more contract to change or revert to. Workers that hold an oﬀer from a ﬁrm at a
contract are matched to that ﬁrm at that contract, remaining ﬁrms and workers are
unmatched.
Note that when some ﬁrm f reverts its position to a new contract, the deferred acceptance
algorithm part can simply continue at whichever oﬀers are held right now, instead of canceling
all oﬀers and restarting the whole process anew. The reason is that no ﬁrm that has not
c h a n g e dac o n t r a c tc a ng a i nb yr e m a k i n ga no ﬀer that was rejected, as it was rejected because
the worker either ﬁnds the oﬀer unacceptable, or has a better oﬀer in hand, and will have so
once more as the algorithm unfolds, now that there are even more desirable contracts than
before.
The Worker Proposing modiﬁed Deferred Acceptance algorithm: MDA
MDA Step 1: All ﬁr m sh a v eo n l yt h e i rﬁrst contract available.
DA: Worker proposing DA sub-algorithm which ends when either no worker has
her oﬀer rejected, or all rejected workers have no more ﬁr m st h e yw a n tt om a k ea n
oﬀer to, at the current contract.
MDA Step k: Any ﬁrm that has its position at contract p
j
i unﬁlled, reverts the
contract to p
j+1
i in case it has another contract to change to. Then the algorithm
continues with the DA steps, where all previous oﬀers are annulled and have to be
remade.
The algorithm ends, when all the ﬁrms that have no oﬀer have no more position
to revert to. At this point any worker whose oﬀer is held by a ﬁrm at a speciﬁc
contract is matched to that ﬁrm at that contract.
Unlike in the ﬁrm proposing algorithm, in the worker proposing MDA, interim oﬀers have
to be annulled, because some worker, who has an oﬀer held by a ﬁrm, may prefer one of the
new contracts that are introduced when a ﬁrm changed its contract.
Theorem 1 Stability: Whenever ﬁrms have a strict ordering over a ﬁnite number of con-
tracts, that is ordered contracts, and for each contract a strict preference ordering over the
workers, and workers have a strict ordering over ﬁrm-contract pairs, then both the ﬁrm and
worker proposing MDA yield a stable outcome.
Theorem 2 Firm-optimal stable match: The ﬁrm proposing MDA yields the ﬁrm optimal
stable match.
10But, as we will see below, the worker proposing MDA need not yield the worker optimal
stable match.
That is in a two-sided matching market with ordered contracts, just as in simple matching
markets, we can deﬁne the set of stable outcomes. Note that for stability the special dynamic
feature of ordered contracts is not taken into account, and so, theorems that use stability in
a market with multiple contracts still apply. Finally, a version of a Gale Shapley deferred
acceptance algorithm yields stable outcomes, and in case ﬁrms propose, indeed the stable
outcome that all ﬁrms prefer over any other stable outcome.
3.3 Some incentive properties of matchings achieved through MDA
Before analyzing incentive properties the modiﬁed deferred acceptance algorithm imposes on
ﬁrms and workers when submitting their preferences, I investigate in more detail how the
outcome of the ﬁrm and worker proposing MDA diﬀer. In simple matching environments,
McVitie and Wilson (1970) and Roth (1984a) showed that all stable matchings have the same
workers and positions matched and share the set of unmatched workers and positions. We can
ﬁnd a version of this theorem in case ﬁrms have ordered contracts about the set of contracts
matched when either the ﬁrm or worker proposing MDA is used.
Theorem 3 The two (possibly diﬀerent) stable outcomes reached through the worker proposing
MDA and the ﬁrm proposing MDA have the same set of workers and the same set of ﬁrms
matched at the same contracts.
The theorem has a few immediate implications. On a ﬁrst note, a ﬁrm proposing MDA seems
computationally easier than the worker proposing MDA, since there, after every reversion of
contracts, all the existing oﬀers have to be cancelled and the whole oﬀering process has to start
anew. However, Theorem 3 implies that a simple way to determine the outcome of a worker
proposing MDA is the following: First, with the use of a ﬁrm proposing MDA determine the set
of contracts that will be used in a worker proposing MDA. Then, with those contracts, simply
run a regular worker proposing deferred acceptance algorithm.
To apply the theory of ordered contracts to actual markets, it is important to understand
the incentives ﬁrms and workers face when submitting their preference list to a centralized
system. The next corollary shows that ﬁrms do not have any incentive to add (or scratch)
undesirable positions (i.e. positions that will not be ﬁlled), on the top of their preference list.
That is ﬁrms cannot gain from manipulating the timing at which they reach various contracts
in either the worker proposing or ﬁrm proposing MDA.
Corollary 1: In both ﬁrm and worker proposing MDA’s, ﬁrms cannot gain by adding con-
tracts that will never be ﬁlled on top of their list or scratching contracts that are completely
11undesirable. Furthermore, in both MDA’s the order in which ﬁrms revert contracts is irrelevant
to the ﬁnal outcome.
However, Theorem 3 also immediately implies that workers may have an incentive to ma-
nipulate their preferences, as, whichever MDA is used, ﬁrm or worker proposing, the set of
contracts ﬁlled is the same.
Corollary 2: The worker and ﬁrm proposing MDA both result in matchings that use the
contracts ﬁlled in the ﬁrm optimal stable match. That is, the worker optimal stable match is not
reached by the worker proposing MDA, unless the worker proposing optimal match has the same
contracts ﬁlled than the ﬁrm optimal MDA. This implies that workers may have an incentive
to misrepresent their preferences even in the worker proposing MDA.
To illustrate the statements of corollary 2,a ne x a m p l ei sm o s tu s e f u l .
Example: Suppose there are two ﬁrms f1 and f2 with two contracts for one position each,
o n ea tl o ww a g eL and one at high wage H,a n dt w ow o r k e r sw1 and w2. Every ﬁrm prefers
to ﬁll the position at the low wage, and prefers, for a given wage, worker w1 over w2. Every






















The worker optimal stable match μW cannot be reached through the worker proposing modiﬁed
deferred acceptance, in fact both ﬁrm and worker proposing MDA’s lead to μF. To see that,
note that in a match with ordered contracts, ﬁrms submit ﬁrst the order of contracts to be
used when trying to ﬁll the position, in this case, the ﬁrst contract is the low wage contract
L, and the second contract is H. Then, for each contract the ﬁr m ss u b m i tt h er a n ko r d e ro v e r
workers, in this case, for both L and H that would be w1,w 2. In a worker proposing MDA, in
the ﬁr s tr o u n d ,t h ea v a i l a b l ec o n t r a c t sa r e ,f o re a c hﬁrm, the low wage contract L. Given these
contracts, the ﬁrst deferred acceptance subalgorithm yields a matching of worker wi with ﬁrm
fi,,for i =1 ,2 and hence matching μF.
Furthermore, each worker has an incentive to misrepresent her preferences. If any of the
two workers submits preferences such that only high wage contracts are acceptable, otherwise
the worker prefers to be unmatched, then the worker can guarantee herself a high wage.
The example also highlights the diﬀerences of a match with ordered contracts, to a mul-
tiple contracts match in which salaries are determined using a standard version of a deferred
acceptance algorithm. In this alternative way to introduce wages (Crawford and Knoer 1981,
and Kelso and Crawford 1982) or also general contracts (Roth 1984b and Hatﬁeld and Milgrom
2005) a ﬁrm i has a ﬁnite set of contracts qi ∈ Qi, and preferences over Qi × W, and every
worker w has preferences over ∪iQi ∪ {w}. Note that a ﬁrm that has multiple contracts does
12not necessarily have more possible rankings over contract-worker pairs compared to a ﬁrm that
has ordered contracts, as long as the ﬁrm with ordered contracts has enough of those (at most
|Qi|·|W| for each ﬁrm i). One diﬀerence of standard models of multiple contracts to a model
with ordered contracts is that in the standard model, all contracts are potentially present si-
multaneously and available immediately. Therefore, if workers were to make oﬀers, they could
immediately oﬀer to work for the highest wage or the most desirable contract. In contrast, an
ordered contracts match has a sequential dimension built in, in which ﬁrms, even when they
a r en o tt h eo n e sm a k i n go ﬀers, decide on the order in which to try to ﬁll contracts. The eﬀect
of this seemingly small diﬀerence can once more best be seen in the continuation of the former
example:
Example continued: Suppose ﬁrms now have both wage oﬀers available immediately,
that is each ﬁrm i submits a preference list (w1,l),(w2,l),(w1,h),(w2,h), that is each ﬁrm
most prefers a worker at a low wage, and for a given wage prefers w1 to w2. Analogously, each
worker w submits preferences (f1,h),(f2,h),(f1,l),(f2,l). Given these submitted rank order
lists, a worker proposing deferred acceptance algorithm will yield μW,a sﬁrst, both workers
make an oﬀer to ﬁrm 1 at a high wage, ﬁrm 1 keeps the oﬀer of worker 1 and rejects w2’s
oﬀer, who makes an oﬀer to work for ﬁrm 2 at the high wage, which is a stable outcome. The
diﬀerence to the match with ordered contracts is that in this multiple contract match the high
wage contracts are available immediately, that is workers can apply to them right away. In the
case of ordered contracts, every ﬁrm has only one contract available at any round of a deferred
acceptance algorithm, and only if a ﬁrm failed to match, does the position change to a new
contract.
That is, in a standard matching model where ﬁrms can have simultaneous multiple con-
tracts, the ﬁrm and worker proposing deferred acceptance algorithm lead in general to diﬀerent
contracts being ﬁlled, even though the same set of ﬁrms will be matched (Hatﬁeld and Milgrom
2005). In the case of a match with ordered contracts, not only is the same set of ﬁrms matched,
but also the same set of contracts, between a ﬁrm proposing and a worker proposing modiﬁed
deferred acceptance algorithm.
T h er o b u s t n e s so ft h i sf e a t u r et oaw o r k e ra n dﬁrm proposing algorithm is helpful in actual
applications, as the NRMP switched to a student proposing algorithm in 1998.5 Introducing
the possibility to have several contracts ranked simultaneously would greatly aﬀect the outcome
of the match. However, the contracts ﬁl l e di nam a t c hw i t ho r d e r e dc o n t r a c t sa r en o ta ﬀected
by the choice of which side of the market makes oﬀers.
5The algorithm designed by Roth and Peranson, and used by the NRMP, works like a worker proposing
MDA (private communication from Alvin Roth.)
134 Matching with Ordered Contracts in the Bulow-Levin
environment.
The general model of Bulow and Levin has N ﬁrms and N workers, where each ﬁrm wants to
hire one worker, and every worker can work for at most one ﬁrm. Firm n’s proﬁt from hiring
worker m at wage p is ∆n ·m−p, where ∆N ≥ .. ≥ ∆1 ≥ 0, and worker m’s utility is p, that is
workers care only about the wage they receive, not for which ﬁrm they work. All preferences and
productivities are common knowledge. In their model of a match, ﬁrms ﬁr s tm a k es i m u l t a n e o u s
salary oﬀers followed by an assortative match, which matches high productivity workers to high
salary ﬁrms, and, in case of salary ties, to more productive ﬁrms. Firms are required to rank
all workers, that is, required to be willing to employ any worker, which is inconsequential when
∆n = n, but not in general.
In a pricing equilibrium ﬁrms choose an oﬀer to maximize their expected proﬁts given the
other ﬁrms’ choices and the matching process. An equilibrium involves mixed strategies. For
ﬁrm n, a mixed strategy is a distribution where Gn(p) denotes the probability that ﬁrm n
oﬀers a salary less or equal than p. Let gn denote the density of ﬁrm n’s oﬀer distribution. In
equilibrium, ﬁrms compete over ranges of salaries with each other, where more productive ﬁrms
oﬀer higher salaries and compete for more productive workers.
To describe the equilibrium, Bulow and Levin ﬁrst identify the set of ﬁr m st h a tc o m p e t e
on each salary level, the density with which they oﬀer wages, and once all but the lowest
productivity ﬁrm is dealt with specify that ﬁrm 1 may oﬀer a wage of zero with a positive
probability.












For any given highest ﬁrm m that oﬀers p, let l(m) be the lowest ﬁrm that oﬀers p, for which
q(m) ≡ q(l(m),m) > 0. Let pN+1 be the highest salary oﬀered, and pn denote the lowest
salary oﬀered by ﬁrm n. Then ﬁrms l(N) ≤ n ≤ N compete on (pN,p N+1] with oﬀer densities
qn(N), where pN is such that ﬁrm N exhausts its oﬀer probability. Then, below oﬀer pN, ﬁrms
l(N − 1),..,N compete on (pN,p N−1] such that ﬁrm N − 1 exhausts all its remaining oﬀer
probability. The process continues until the behavior of ﬁrms 2,..,N is speciﬁed. If ∆1 = ∆2,
then ﬁrm 1’s behavior is also speciﬁed. Otherwise, ﬁrm 1 oﬀers zero with its remaining oﬀer
probability, namely G1(0) = 1 −
P
n
q1(n) · (pn+1 − pn).
Theorem 4 Bulow and Levin (forthcoming): There is a unique price equilibrium. Letting
qn(.) and p1,..,p N+1 and G1(0) be deﬁnes as above, then for each ﬁrm n, and each non-empty
interval [pm,p m+1],g n(p)=qn(m) for all p ∈ (pm,p m+1].
14First, I show that the equilibrium of Bulow and Levin does not survive the introduction of
ordered contracts.
Theorem 5 Suppose all ﬁr m sh a v eo n l yo n ep o s i t i o n ,a n do ﬀer wages pi according to Bulow
and Levin. If some ﬁrm i can oﬀer two wages, pS
i - for which it can restrict which workers are
acceptable - and pi - for which any worker is eligible, then the ﬁrm makes strict positive gains
from using that possibility.
Furthermore, if every ﬁrm has an ordered star-position contract, then competitive wages
are an equilibrium outcome. Let ci be the lowest competitive wage of worker i, then c1 =0 ,
ci+1 = ci + ∆i.
Theorem 6 Competitive Equilibrium Wages: The following strategies form a Nash equi-
librium: Every ﬁrm announces pi = ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ N and pS
N = cN with only worker wN being
eligible, and pS
j = cj+1 for j<Nand the workers being eligible for pS
j are workers wj+1 and
higher. The workers report their preferences truthfully, that is they rank all contracts such that
they prefer higher wages to lower wages, and for a given wage more productive ﬁrms.
That is a match with ordered contracts, which provides a description of the actual possibil-
ities oﬀered by the NRMP algorithm, allows for competitive outcomes and does not necessarily
result in lower wages.
5 Wages of Medical Fellows with and without a Match
The National Residency Matching Program allows for ordered contracts. In the 1990’s about
7 percent of the three to four thousand programs that participate in each year have positions
with contracts that could revert to other contracts if they remain unﬁlled (accounting for
almost 6 percent of the total quota of positions).6 In the reinstitution of the fellowship match
for Gastroenterology fellows, this feature is also especially advertised to, for example, allow
programs to try to ﬁll a slot ﬁrst with a research fellow, and in case no suitable research fellow
can be attracted the program can decide to ﬁll this position with a more clinically oriented
fellow instead (see Niederle, Proctor and Roth 2006).
Ordered contracts therefore allow a program to replicate how they may try to ﬁll positions in
a decentralized market, namely to try to ﬁnd a research fellow, and only go for a clinical fellow in
case no suitable candidate can be attracted.7 In an ordered contracts match a program can do
6This feature is also used by the APPIC Internship Matching Program sponsored and supervised by the
Association of Psychology Postdoctoral and Internship Centers (APPIC).
7Many economics departments that may have tried to hire a senior faculty in a ﬁeld, opt for a junior person
once they were not so successful.
15that without compromising the quality of the applicant pool they can consider for their second
contract (Corollary 1). It is however not clear that in a decentralized market, a program may
n o tb eh u r ti fi tt r i e st oﬁll a position ﬁrst under a certain contract, and then only later under
a second contract. If some applicants have already been hired (for example by programs that
have not tried to ﬁll the position ﬁrst under another contract), then a program may actually
lose some potential candidates, simply by having tried to ﬁll a position ﬁrst under a diﬀerent
contract.
Indeed, Niederle and Roth (2004), and Niederle, Proctor and Roth (2006) showed that
the market for gastroenterology fellows, after they stopped using the centralized match, once
more unraveled.8 The market fails to be one big market in which all positions are oﬀered
simultaneously. A survey of gastroenterology program directors reveals that programs use terse
deadlines on oﬀers that limit the possibilities of candidates to simultaneously consider other
oﬀers. And while a few program directors (9% of respondents) did not oﬀe rt h es a m ew a g et o
all their incoming fellows, they all responded that wages were not adjusted to outside oﬀers.
Similar results hold for other terms of fellowship contracts such as hours on call.
The survey results are supported by data on the internal medicine fellowship market.
Niederle and Roth (2003b) show that the market is more localized without a centralized match,
that is, more gastroenterology fellows remain at the same hospital, the same city and the same
state where they did their internal medicine residency, than with a match. Furthermore, one
can compare wages of fellows whose specialties participate in a match, with wages of fellows
whose specialty matches in a decentralized way. In internal medicine, of all subspecialties that
require three years of prior residency, in the years between 2002 and 2004 four specialties used
the MSMP (Medical Specialties Matching Program) while ten did not. Niederle and Roth
(2003a) compare wages of all programs that report positive wages excluding those from Puerto
Rico using the data from the Graduate Medical Education Library 2002-2003. A simple regres-
sion of the wage on a match dummy (which is one when the specialty uses the match) reveals
no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the match. Similarly, comparing wages within hospitals for specialties
that use a match and that do not, ﬁnds only a small, positive, signiﬁcant (but not economically
signiﬁcant) eﬀect of a match on wages. Similar results were found for the next year, using the
Graduate Medical Education Library 2003-2004 data (Niederle and Roth 2004).
That is, it is not clear that a match compresses or lowers wages, because on the one hand,
the ordered contracts match used by the NRMP allows for wage competition. Furthermore, the
gastroenterology market, as well as the history of the residency market strongly suggest that
a market without a centralized match may not be a competitive market. While the NRMP
8The failure of the gastroenterology fellowship match is one of the rare instances in which a match which
produces stable outcomes has been abandonned. McKiney, Niederle and Roth (2005) argue that this failure was
due to an unusual event, and shed light not only why this market failed, but also why such failures are so rare.
16does not in fact force wages to be impersonal, we still observe a lot of impersonal wages. In
that, residents or ﬁrst year fellow may however not be unique. For example, in many economic
departments, ﬁrst year salaries of junior faculty hired in the same year are often the same. As
such the lessons of Bulow and Levin may still apply, that wages are more compressed than if
each worker were paid their marginal productivity, however the match does not seem to be the
major culprit.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The NRMP is a match with ordered contracts, which allows for programs to eﬀectively have
more than one contract per position. This paper analyzes the properties of a match with
ordered contracts, and as such ﬁlls a gap in the existing matching literature by analyzing the
actual algorithm used by the NRMP, and providing a new tool to be used for future designs of
centralized matches. I show that a match with ordered contracts has novel implications, most
notably that the set of contracts ﬁlled is the same, whether a ﬁrm or worker proposing modiﬁed
deferred acceptance algorithm is used.
In light of the controversy about the eﬀects of a centralized match on wages, this paper shows
that a match with ordered contracts allows for competitive equilibrium wages. Furthermore,
ordered contracts allow programs to try to hire diﬀerent kinds of candidates, without taking any
penalty on the set of applicants available once they unsuccessfully tried to ﬁll a position under
their ﬁrst contract. Compared to a decentralized market a centralized match may increase
competition, as it does not allow programs to lock in candidates early, before other programs
have ﬁnished reverting their contracts to diﬀerent contracts.
7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: Stability: Stability in the case of ﬁrm proposing MDA is trivial, as
any ﬁrm made an oﬀer to any worker it preferred more, and got rejected by that worker (which
implies the worker has a better oﬀer in hand). To show stability in the worker proposing MDA
outcome, note that for a given set of contracts used in the ﬁnal MDA step the outcome is stable
to deviations that only use these contracts, because the DA yields stable outcomes (see Gale
and Shapley 1962, and section 3.1). Therefore I only need to show that no worker prefers a
position p
j
i that got reverted into p
j+1
i . Suppose that at some step in the MDA,a tt h ee n do f
the DA part, a position p
j
i is unﬁlled. Let the interim matching be μ, where μ is the worker
optimal stable match given the contracts available. Then, at μ, for any worker w eligible for
p
j




i gets reverted into p
j+1
i . Technically, this is equivalent to adding a new
ﬁrm to an existing market. By Gale and Sotomayor (1985), adding a ﬁrm implies that the
new worker optimal stable match μ0 satisﬁes for any worker w: μ0(w) ºw μ(w). That is, every
17worker eligible for p
j
i still has μ0(w) Âw p
j
i. This is true for any reversion, that is no worker
would accept a contract that was reverted into another contract. ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 : F i r m - o p t i m a ls t a b l em a t c h :F o r a ﬁrm f, deﬁne a worker,
contract pair (pf,w) to be achievable, if there exists a stable matching at which ﬁrm f is
matched to worker w at contract pf. I show, by induction, that the stable outcome produced
by the ﬁrm proposing MDA matches every ﬁrm to their most preferred achievable worker,
contract pair, and is therefore the (unique) ﬁrm optimal stable matching. Assume that up to
a give step in the procedure no ﬁrm has yet been rejected at a contract by a worker who is
achievable. At this step suppose that worker w rejects ﬁrm f at contract pf. If worker w rejects
ﬁrm f at contract pf as unacceptable (i.e. w Âw pf), then this worker is unachievable at this
contract and I’m done. If worker w rejects ﬁrm f at contract pf in favor of a ﬁrm g at contract
pg,Is h o wt h a tw is not achievable for ﬁrm f at contract pf.
Firm g prefers w at pg to any other worker, contract pair except for those workers that have
already rejected ﬁrm g at contract pg and at any contracts in place before the contract got
reverted into pg, and hence (by the inductive assumption) are unachievable to ﬁrm g. Consider
a hypothetical matching μ that matches ﬁrm f to worker w at contract pf and everyone else
to an achievable worker contract pair. Then ﬁrm g prefers w at contract pg to the achievable
worker, contract pair at μ. So, the matching μ is unstable, since it is blocked by (g,pg,w), who
prefer each other to their match at μ. Therefore there is no stable matching that matches f to
w at pf, and so worker w is not achievable to ﬁrm f at contract pf, which completes the proof.
¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 :The worker proposing and ﬁrm proposing MDA follow the same
steps, the only diﬀerence being that the interim matching is reached by either a ﬁrm proposing
or a worker proposing DA. However, McVitie and Wilson (1970) and Roth (1984a) showed that
for a given set of workers and ﬁrms, all stable matchings have the same workers and positions
matched and share the set of unmatched workers and positions. This implies that at any interim
match at the end of a DA step, in both MDA algorithms, the same positions are unﬁlled and
get reverted into the same set of new contracts. I have already made the argument, that the
DA part of ﬁr m s ,c a na se a s i l yb et h o u g h to fa so n ei nw h i c ha l lf o r m e ro ﬀers are annulled and
remade.¥
Proof of Corollary 1: By adding undesirable contracts at the top of the preference list
(or scratching them), a ﬁrm does not inﬂuence the set of stable matchings. Hence a ﬁrm does
not inﬂuence the set of contracts that are the outcome of both the ﬁrm and worker proposing
MDA.
In the worker proposing MDA no ﬁrm can beneﬁt from delaying its reversion of positions,
as the more steps of the MDA pass, the more desirable the competing positions become. Since
the DA step restarts whenever there is a change in a contract, delaying to revert a position, that
18is having a round in which a position by a ﬁrm is unﬁlled has no eﬀect. In the ﬁrm proposing
algorithm, the statement is equivalent to the statement that in a regular Deferred Acceptance
algorithm, some ﬁrms may start making oﬀers only after some others ﬁrms already made oﬀers.
This does not aﬀect the outcome of a Deferred Acceptance algorithm. ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 :Every ﬁrm i h a sah i g h e s tw a g ei n t e r v a lt h a ti to ﬀers with a constant
density, let it be [pL
i ,p H
i ], on which it competes for several workers, the highest being wH and
the lowest one wL. The highest (and lowest) worker is easily determined by determining the
highest (or respectively, lowest) ﬁrm that is oﬀering a wage on this highest wage interval of ﬁrm
i. Suppose that all other ﬁrms use the mixed strategies from before, then the following strategy
makes ﬁrm i in expectation strictly better oﬀ.L e t pS
i =( pH
i − pL
i )/2 and the only worker
eligible for that wage be wH. It is easy to see that ﬁrm i is strictly better oﬀ with this strategy,
then foregoing the possibility to use a pS
i job at all. The reason is that ﬁrm i is indiﬀerent
between all wages it oﬀers in the Bulow and Levin equilibrium, so its proﬁt is determined by
for example oﬀering wage pi = pH
i and hiring any of the workers wH,...,wi with (diﬀerent)
positive probability. So, trying to hire worker wH at a lower wage ﬁrst, with the use of the
star-contract, which is successful with positive probability, strictly increases expected payoﬀs.
¥
Proof of Theorem 6: First I show that a ﬁrm i cannot gain by deviating. Without ﬁrm
i,r e s u l t i n gw a g e sw o u l db ecj for worker wj, and workers wj with j>iwork for ﬁrm j, while
workers wj with j ≤ i work for ﬁrm j − 1. If ﬁrm i submits the strategies suggested by the
theorem, ﬁrm i hires worker wi at the lowest competitive wage for wi (displacing ﬁrm i − 1).
Firm i c a n n o th i r ea n yw o r k e r swj with j>i ,unless ﬁrm i is willing to pay ε more than
competitive wages, and may hire workers wj with j ≤ i at competitive wages. So, given the
deﬁnition of lowest competitive wages, ﬁrm i cannot make higher proﬁts than hiring worker wi
at ci.
Now I show that workers cannot gain by deviating either. Given the strategies of ﬁrms,
and workers j>i ,worker i is eligible, and the highest ranked worker of the standard contract
of ﬁrm i at ci, the star-contract of ﬁrm i − 1 at ci, and contracts at wages lower than ci. Any
higher wage contract is not achievable for worker wi. Hence, worker wi, by reporting truthfully
receives the highest wage he can receive given the strategies of other ﬁrms and workers.¥
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